Abstract. Tompa and Woll considered a problem of cheaters in (k; n) threshold secret sharing schemes. We rst derive a tight lower bound on the size of shares jVij for this problem: jVij (jSj 0 1)= + 1, where Vi denotes the set of shares of participant Pi, S denotes the set of secrets, and denotes the cheating probability. We next present an optimum scheme which meets the equality of our bound by using \dierence sets."
1 Introduction (k; n) threshold secret sharing schemes [2, 3] have been studied extensively so far because of their wide applications in elds, like key management and secure computation. In such a scheme, a dealer D distributes a secret s to n participants P 1 ; : : : ; P n in such a way that any k or more participants can recover the secret s but any k 0 1 or fewer participants have no information on s. A piece of information given to P i is called a share and is denoted by v i . An important issue in secret sharing schemes is the size of shares jV i j, where V i 4 = fv i j Pr(v i ) > 0g, because the security of a system will decrease if jV i j increases. Let S 4 = fs j Pr(s) > 0g. Then it is known that jV i j jSj in any (k; n) threshold scheme [4] .
Tompa and Woll [1] considered the following scenario. Suppose that k 0 1 participants P 1 ; : : : ; P k01 want to cheat a k-th participant P k by opening forged and v k is dierent from the original secret s. Tompa and Woll showed that Shamir's scheme [2] is insecure against this attack in that even a single participant can, with high probability, deceive k 0 1 honest participants. They showed a scheme secure against this problem, but jV i j in their scheme is very large: jV i j = ((jSj 0 1)(k 0 1)= + k) 2 (1)
where denotes the cheating probability. Carpentieri, De Santis, and Vaccaro [5] recently showed the following lower bound on jV i j for this problem: jV i j jSj=:
Now, we see that there is a big gap between eq. (1) and (2) . Both of them can be improved. Furthermore, in the derivation of eq. (2) it is assumed that k 0 1 cheaters P 1 ; : : : ; P k01 somehow know the secret s before they cheat P k . (We call this the CDV assumption.)
In this paper we rst derive a tight lower bound on jV i j for this problem by using a probabilistic method. In deriving our bound, we do not use the CDV assumption. That is, it is assumed that k 0 1 cheaters have no information on s (according to the denition of (k; n) threshold secret sharing schemes). Let be the probability that P 1 ; : : : ; P k01 can cheat P k . Then our bound is jV i j (jSj 0 1)= + 1:
We then present an optimum scheme which meets the equality of our bound by using \dierence sets." A planar dierence set modulo N = l(l 0 1) + 1 is a set of l numbers B = fd 0 ; d 1 ; : : : ; d l01 g with the property that the l(l 0 1)
, when reduced modulo N, are exactly the numbers 1; 2; : : : ; N 01 in some order [6] . It is known that there exists a planar dierence set if l is a prime power [6] . Our optimum scheme is then characterized as follows.
If there exists a planar dierence set modulo N = l(l 0 1) + 1 such that N is a prime, then there exists a (k; n) threshold secret sharing scheme which meets the equality of our bound eq. (3) such that jSj = l; = 1=l; n < N. There exists a (k; n) threshold secret sharing scheme which meets the equality of our bound eq. (3) such that jSj = l; = =l; n < N if there exists a (N; l; ) dierence set B in (GF (N); +). It is known that there exists a (N; l; ) dierence set B in (GF (N); +) such that N = 4t 0 1; l = 2t 0 1; = t 0 1 [7] .
Finally, for the model with the CDV assumption, we show a lower bound on jV i j more tight than eq. (2) by using the same technique we use to derive eq. A slightly dierent problem has been studied by other researchers. McElice and Sarwate [8] showed that in Shamir's (k; n) threshold scheme, any group of k+ 2e participants which includes at most e cheaters can always identify cheaters and correctly calculate the secret. (More than k participants are required though.)
The problem of identifying cheaters has also been studied [9, 10, 11, 12] . Those schemes, however, require jV i j much bigger than the bound given in eq. (3). On the other hand, in this paper, we are interested only in detecting the fact of cheating. 
Known bound on jV i j under the CDV assumption
Carpentieri, De Santis, and Vaccaro [5] showed the following lower bound on jV i j by using entropy. In deriving that bound they assumed that k 0 1 cheaters P i 1 ; : : : ; P i k01 shomehow know the secret s before they cheat P k , although, in the denition of (k; n) threshold secret sharing schemes, k 0 1 cheaters have no Denition 4. [5] A (k; n) threshold secret sharing scheme is called a (k; n; ) robust secret sharing scheme if P 0 (Cheat j V i 1 ; : : : ; V i k01 ; S) for any fi 1 ; : : : ; i k01 g f1; : : : ; ng.
Proposition 5. [5] In a (k; n; ) robust secret sharing scheme, if the secret is uniformly chosen, then jV i j jSj=.
3 New Lower Bound on jV i j 3.1 Denition of secure secret sharing
In this section we derive a tight lower bound on jV i j by using a probabilistic method. In deriving this bound we do not make the CDV assumption (see subsection 2.2). That is, it is assumed that, according to the denition of (k; 
Proof. Consider cheaters P i1 ; : : : ; P i k01 such that only P i1 opens a forged share Proposition 12. [7] There exists a (N; l; ) dierence set B in (GF (N) ; +) such that N = 4t 0 1; l = 2t 0 1; = t 0 1, where t is a positive integer. Example 2. [7] B = f1; 3; 4; 5; 9g is a (11; 5; 2)-dierence set in (GF (11); +).
Optimum scheme based on planar dierence set
In this subsection we show that if there exists a planar dierence set modulo N = l(l 0 1) + 1 such that N is a prime, then there exists a (k; n; ) secure secret sharing scheme which meets the equality of our bound eq. (6) (9) from Laglange formula [13] .
Proposition 13 (Lagrange formula). [13] Let h(x) be a polynomial over GF (N) such that deg h(x) = k 0 1 Thus (A2) of Defnition 1 is also satised.
u t
Lemma 15. The proposed scheme is a (k; n; ) secure secret sharing scheme such that jSj = l; = 1=l and n < N . Furthermore, the equality of eq. (6) (11), (12) and (13), such that N is a prime, then there exists a (k; n; ) secure secret sharing scheme which meets the equality of our bound eq. (6) such that jSj = l; = 1=l; n < N.
>From proposition 10, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 17. Let q be a prime power such that q 2 + q + 1 is a prime. Then, there exists a (k; n; ) secure secret sharing scheme which meets the equality of eq. (6) such that jSj = q + 1; = 1=(q + 1) and n < q 2 + q + 1.
Remark. Instead of publicizing a planar dierence set B itself, it is enough to publicize two points 0 and 1 of P G(2; jSj 0 1 there exists a (k; n; ) secure secret sharing scheme which meets the equality of our bound eq. (6) such that jSj = l; = =l; n < N .
The following corollary is obtained from proposition 12.
Corollary 19. For a positive integer t such that 4t 0 1 is a prime power, there exists a (k; n; ) secure secret sharing scheme which meets the equality of our bound eq. (6) 
Proof. Consider cheaters P i1 ; : : : ; P i k01 such that only P i1 opens a forged share v 0 i1 (6 = v 
Proof. Consider a probabilistic P i1 such as shown in the proof of Theorem 8. u t
